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NOTE
THE BASEL III LIQUIDITY COVERAGE RATIO
AND FINANCIAL STABILITY
Andrew W. Hartlage*
Banks and other financial institutions may increase the amount of credit
available in the financial system by borrowing for short terms and lending
for long terms. Though this "maturity transformation" is a useful and pro-
ductive function of banks, it gives rise to the possibility that even prudently
managed banks could fail due to a lack of liquid assets. The financial crisis
of 2007-2008 revealed the extent to which the U.S. financial system is ex-
posed to the risk of a system-wide failure from insufficient liquidity.
Financial regulators from economies around the world have responded to
the crisis by proposing new, internationally uniform bank liquidity stand-
ards, augmenting the existing Basel Capital Accord. This Note argues that
a major component of these standards, the Liquidity Coverage Ratio re-
quirement, may work to undermine the goals of effective liquidity
regulation and instead contribute to issues of systemic risk.
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INTRODUCTION
Among the most dramatic and consequential events of the recent finan-
cial crisis was the panic in U.S. credit markets in September 2008. Spooked
investors, unable to determine the health of financial institutions and fearing
the worst after the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy, rushed to withdraw their
money and sought refuge in the safest assets, the modem equivalent of hid-
ing cash inside mattresses. A shortage of "liquid" assets-cash and assets
readily convertible into cash'-precipitated a massive credit contraction that
threatened poorly managed and well-managed banks alike with failure. Ex-
traordinary measures by U.S. financial regulators and Congress avoided a
systemic collapse, but the crisis propelled the economy into a recession, fol-
lowed by a period of stagnation from which the country has yet to emerge.
The crisis revealed the extent to which firms at the center of the financial
system had relied on short-term borrowing to finance their activities. When
managed prudently, the process of taking on short-term debts to finance
longer-term loans, such as mortgages, is a useful and productive activity at
the heart of the modem financial system; however, this utility comes at a
price-banks fail when this short-term funding disappears.2 Failures at indi-
vidual firms can spread to envelop the entire financial system through
connections between financial institutions and other transmission channels.
Effective regulation, then, seeks to balance the salutary effects of longer-
term lending with the risks and costs of system-wide failure.
In the aftermath of this crisis, world governments acted to reduce sys-
temic risk in the financial system by strengthening liquidity regulations. In
December 2010, the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision-a college
of central bankers and other financial regulators from the United States and
other advanced economies-proposed new liquidity requirements meant to
promote the resilience of the banking sector.3 This Note examines one of
these new requirements: the Liquidity Coverage Ratio ("LCR"), the Basel
Committee's newly proposed minimum threshold for short-term liquidity.
The LCR is designed to measure a bank's resilience over thirty days if faced
with a crisis-like situation where some classes of creditors (e.g., other finan-
1. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1015 (9th ed. 2009) (defining "liquidity").
2. For a fuller discussion of this "maturity transformation" function of banks, see infra
Section I.A.
3. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BASEL II: INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK
FOR LIQUIDITY RISK MEASUREMENT, STANDARDS AND MONITORING (2010) [hereinafter BA-
SEL III LIQUIDITY FRAMEWORK], available at http://www.bis.org/pub/bcbs 1 88.pdf.
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cial institutions) suddenly withdraw from credit markets.4 The Basel Com-
mittee will accept comments on the proposal and announce amendments, if
any, by mid-2016 at the latest.5 The standards will go into effect, with any
amendments, by January 1, 2018.6
This Note argues that the LCR as proposed may work to undermine the
stability of the financial system rather than reduce systemic risk. Part I
introduces the concept of maturity transformation, the risks it creates, and
the regulatory responses it has provoked. Part II uses a simple model of
bank liquidity to demonstrate how certain strategies for complying with the
LCR may cause banks to increase borrowing to unsustainable levels, and
argues that the LCR will likely push banks to engage in regulatory arbitrage,
resulting in reduced financial stability. Finally, Part III reinforces this con-
clusion by presenting evidence of market distortions brought about by a rule
similar to the LCR, which was enacted in the Republic of Korea after its
financial crisis in the late 1990s.
I. LIQUIDITY, BANK PANICS, AND LIQUIDITY REGULATION
Modem societies rely on the financial system to help spread capital effi-
ciently throughout the economy. A modem financial system performs
several crucial roles in spreading capital, including transferring resources
across time and space, managing risk, clearing and settling payments, pool-
ing resources, and providing information.7 Banks are key players in the
financial system, and they help mitigate the significant informational costs
of assessing and monitoring the creditworthiness of borrowers. 8 Another
important function of the modem financial system, and one traditionally
performed only by commercial banks, is "maturity transformation" 9 -the
process by which banks accept short-term debts, such as deposits payable on
demand, and use these funds to make longer-term loans to borrowers.' 0 Sec-
tion L.A explains the nature and inherent risks of maturity transformation,
and Section I.B describes the regulatory responses to these risks. This dis-
cussion frames the detailed analysis of the LCR in Part II.
4. The LCR is discussed in detail infra in Section H.A.
5. BASEL III LIQUIDITY FRAMEWORK, supra note 3, paras. 9, 197.
6. Id. para. 9.
7. Robert C. Merton & Zvi Bodie, A Conceptual Framework for Analyzing the Finan-
cial Environment, in DWIGHT B. CRANE ET AL., THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM 3, 12-15
(1995).
8. See Hayne E. Leland & David H. Pyle, Informational Asymmetries, Financial
Structure, and Financial Intermediation, 32 J. FIN. 371, 382-84 (1977) (arguing that financial
intermediaries-lenders who make and hold loans-are a solution to the problem of extracting
value from specialized information on borrowers).
9. See Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, Banking Theory, Deposit Insurance,
and Bank Regulation, 59 J. Bus. 55, 62 (1986) ("This transformation service is the most subtle
and probably the most important function of banks.").
10. Jeffrey D. Sachs, Alternative Approaches to Financial Crises in Emerging Markets,
in CAPITAL FLOWS AND FINANCIAL CRISES 247, 250 (Miles Kahler ed., 1998).
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A. Maturity Transformation and Financial Instability
The following example illustrates the maturity transformation process: A
bank accepts $1,000 in demand deposits from each of 1,000 depositors. By
the terms of the contracts between each depositor and the bank, a demand-
deposit holder has the right to withdraw his or her funds "on demand"-that
is, at any time. These deposits appear on the bank's balance sheet as a $1
million liability: the demand-deposit contract sets up a creditor-debtor rela-
tionship between the bank and the depositor, with the bank as debtor and the
depositor as creditor. Depositors withdraw and add money to their deposit
accounts as they save and consume. In this way, the $1 million liability on
the bank's balance sheet fluctuates over time.
However, if the depositors' additions to and withdrawals from the ac-
counts are random, there forms within the demand deposits a portion of
funds that is statistically stable." Returning to the example in the previous
paragraph, assume the bank has determined that $800,000 of the $1 million
deposit is stable. The bank then makes $800,000 in mortgage loans to indi-
viduals and keeps the remainder of the money as cash in its vaults or
securities that are readily convertible into cash, such as U.S. government
debt. The mortgage borrowers agree to pay back principal and interest over
thirty years. The bank uses the cash and liquid securities to satisfy day-to-
day customer withdrawal requests. The bank's common stockholders invest
cash in the amount of $32,000 to absorb losses from bad mortgage loans.
This amount appears on the bank's balance sheet as $32,000 in sharehold-
ers' equity. The balance sheet of the example bank is given below:
TABLE 1
EXAMPLE BANK BALANCE SHEET
Assets Liabilities and Shareholder's Equity
Cash and Liquid Securities = $232,000 Demand Deposits = $1,000,000
Thirty-Year Mortgages = $800,000 Common Stock = $32,000
Total = $1,032,000 Total = $1,032,000
Through this process, the bank has transformed short-term obligations
(demand deposits) into long-term obligations (thirty-year mortgages). This
insight-that in normal times, stability emerges from the random, independ-
ent interactions of a large collection of depositors-forms the basis for the
maturity transformation process.
11. Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and
Liquidity, 91 J. POL. ECON. 401,404 (1983).
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This process accrues benefits not only for the bank but also for the
economy. The bank earns interest income equal to the interest collected
from borrowers minus the interest paid to depositors. Provided that long-
term interest rates are higher than short-term interest rates, 12 banks profit
from maturity transformation by charging borrowers an interest rate keyed
to higher long-term rates while paying interest at a rate keyed to lower
short-term rates. But banks are not the only beneficiaries of maturity trans-
formation: long-term borrowers benefit through an increased supply of
long-term loans, and thus the improved affordability of long-term asset
financing. For example, in the case of residential homebuyers, who must
decide between leasing or purchasing a home, longer-term loans can help
lower monthly mortgage payments and thus make home ownership more
attractive vis-A-vis home rental. 3 Moreover, banks' comparative expertise
in determining and monitoring creditworthiness 4 implies that borrowers
for whom determining creditworthiness is expensive (e.g., individuals)
have few alternatives to bank credit. To the extent that banks can offer
longer-term loans, this does much to increase the supply of long-term
financing to such borrowers.
However, maturity transformation also exposes banks to liquidity risk.
As mentioned above, the maturity-transformation process depends on the
probabilistic stability of short-term debt. If the assumptions regarding de-
positor stability fail to hold, banks risk defaulting on their debt due to a lack
of available cash to satisfy withdrawals. Scholars refer to this type of sudden
demand by the depositors of a single bank as a "run."' 5 Returning to the ex-
ample bank discussed above, if 500 of the bank's depositors simultaneously
lost confidence in the bank and suddenly withdrew their funds, totaling
$500,000, the bank could satisfy only $232,000 of this demand with its cash
and liquid securities. Moreover, it could not easily turn its thirty-year mort-
gage loans into cash. 16 It could attempt to borrow more money, but it would
12. This assumption holds under normal economic conditions, but a number of theories
compete to explain this phenomenon. A fuller explanation is beyond the scope of this Note,
but for more analysis on the theories of interest rates, see J.R. HICKS, VALUE AND CAPITAL
144-47 (2d ed. 1946) (explaining longer-term interest rates as reflective of expectations re-
garding future short-term rates), and JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF
EMPLOYMENT INTEREST AND MONEY 165-74 (1936) (theorizing that interest rates are in part
determined by investors' willingness to forego liquidity).
13. The thirty-year mortgage helped contribute to the post-World War 11 home-ownership
boom. See Albert Chevan, The Growth of Home Ownership: 1940-1980, 26 DEMOGRAPHY 249,
249-50 (1989).
14. See generally Douglas W. Diamond, Financial Intermediation and Delegated Moni-
toring, 51 REv. ECON. STUD. 393 (1984).
15. E.g., Gary Gorton & Andrew Winton, Financial Intermediation, in IA HANDBOOK
OF THE ECONOMICS OF FINANCE: CORPORATE FINANCE 431, 495-96 (George M. Constan-
tinides et al. eds., 2003).
16. The large information asymmetries in loans create the potential for adverse selec-
tion problems, making the outright-sale market for mortgages akin to a market for "lemons."
See generally George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the
Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. EcON. 488, 489-91 (1970). One would therefore expect loans to
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likely incur difficulties in the face of depositors' general lack of confidence.
Thus, this sudden withdrawal could lead the bank to default on its obliga-
tions and, in the worst case scenario, to fail.
Runs can quickly become "panics"-system-wide demands on banks-
and ultimately adversely affect the real economy. Depositors might run on
their bank without specific concerns about that bank's health: they could be
fearful generally of banks due to macroeconomic conditions 7 or they could
run on the bank irrationally. 8 Once some depositors begin to withdraw
funds, the remaining depositors could rush to withdraw as well, before the
limited resources available to the bank to satisfy creditors are depleted. i9
Credit would become scarce, scuttling long-term asset purchases such as
real estate. 0 Historically, financial crises usually precede significant de-
clines in economic output and employment." l
The ineluctable two-sided nature of maturity transformation has real
consequences for policymakers. Regulators cannot hope to eliminate the
possibility of bank runs or systemic panics without discarding the benefits
of maturity transformation.22 Thus, regulations mitigating liquidity risk must
balance the risks of excessive maturity mismatch and the potential for runs
against the impact of reduced credit and depressed bank performance on
economic growth. The following Section reviews the approaches of regula-
tors around the world to liquidity regulation.
B. Regulatory Responses to Liquidity Risk
No international consensus exists on the "right" way to regulate liquidity
at financial firms. The following Sections survey the varying approaches to
liquidity regulations employed by countries around the world.23 Section
trade at a significant discount, even under normal conditions; if banks must sell assets quickly,
these discounts would deepen, making this an even more punitive deleveraging strategy. See
generally Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, Fire Sales in Finance and Macroeconomics, J.
EcON. PERSP., Winter 2011, at 29, 30 (describing financial fire sales in general).
17. See Gorton & Winton, supra note 15, at 505 (reviewing the literature on infor-
mation-based theories of banking panics).
18. See Diamond & Dybvig, supra note 11, at 404 (noting that runs "could depend on
almost anything").
19. See id. at 403.
20. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
21. CARMEN M. REINHART & KENNETH S. ROGOFF, THIS TIME Is DIFFERENT 224
(2009). Professors Reinhart and Rogoff's survey of financial crises in advanced countries from
1815 to 2007 reveals that, on average, banking crises result in a 7 percent increase in unem-
ployment trough to peak, and a 9.3 percent drop in real per-capita GDP peak to trough. Id. at
229 fig.14.3, 230 fig.14.4.
22. DANIEL K. TARULLO, BANKING ON BASEL 28 (2008); see also Diamond & Dybvig,
supra note 11, at 409 ("A demand deposit contract which is not subject to runs provides no
liquidity services:').
23. This Note reviews only positive requirements with respect to liquidity meant to
prevent failure. This excludes those public mechanisms meant to support ailing firms in crisis,
such as Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC") receivership, deposit insurance
[Vol. 111:453
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I.B.1 describes the United States' process-oriented approach, and analyzes
recent developments regarding large banks and systemically significant
nonbanks. Section I.B.2 discusses how European Union ("EU") require-
ments for domestic liquidity regulation are patterned after the U.S.
approach, and describes recent shifts by some member states toward "hard-
er" numerical requirements. Section I.B.3 reviews the work of the Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision to harmonize liquidity regulation across
international borders. By imposing a uniform international standard, the
Basel IlI liquidity risk management provisions will impose order on a cur-
rently fragmented system, but doing so requires the introduction of new
types of liquidity requirements on firms in countries important to the global
economy, such as the United States.
1. Liquidity Regulation in the United States
U.S. banking regulators seek to control liquidity risk by inspecting the
processes of liquidity-risk management at regulated firms using what this
Note calls a "qualitative" approach.24 Rather than set minimum levels of
cash and liquid securities as a portion of liabilities, safety-and-soundness
regulators consider management of liquidity risk to be part of prudent bank-
management practice; government examiners use supervisory audits to
evaluate firms' internal liquidity risk management processes," looking for
oversight of liquidity-risk tolerances by the bank's board of directors, suffi-
cient management information systems to track liquidity risk, the
establishment and periodic adjustment of risk limits, and the development of
a liquidity contingency plan.26 Deficient liquidity-risk management could in-
vite supervisory action, including a cease-and-desist order. 27 Also, in
principle, a bank's performance in liquidity-risk management could affect its
schemes, and discount-window lending, as well as emergency lending to nonbanks under
section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. § 343 (2006 & Supp. V 2011). For an
analysis of these mechanisms, see Andrew W. Hartlage, Note, Europe's Failure to Prepare for
the Next Financial Crisis Affects Us All, 44 GEO. J. INT'L L. (forthcoming 2013).
24. By contrast, this Note defines a "quantitative" requirement as a rule that mandates a
certain numerical level of cash and liquid securities, usually expressed as a ratio over a portion
of the bank's liabilities. The LCR is a quantitative requirement. See infra Section Il.A for a
detailed explanation of the LCR.
25. As of 2010, all four major safety-and-soundness regulators (the FDIC, the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and
the now-abolished Office of Thrift Supervision) had incorporated liquidity-risk management
elements into their supervisory guidelines. See Interagency Policy Statement on Funding and
Liquidity Risk Management, 75 Fed. Reg. 13,656, 13,660 & n.8 (Mar. 22, 2010) (collecting
citations).
26. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, COMPTROLLER'S
HANDBOOK: LIQUIDITY 27-44 (2001), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/publications
/publications-by-type/comptrollers-handbook/pdf/liquidity.pdf.
27. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)-(c) (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (granting the FDIC the
power to issue cease-and-desist orders to banks under its direct supervision and, in limited
circumstances, to institutions regulated by other regulators).
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composite CAMELS rating,"8 which in part determines the amount of depos-
it-insurance premiums paid by a financial firm.29 However, as the liquidity
component is one component among six that determine a firm's composite
CAMELS rating,30 which itself is one of many factors used to compute de-
posit-insurance assessment rates, 3' any effect of liquidity-risk-management
audit findings on deposit assessment rates is highly attenuated.
Since the economic crisis, Congress has acted to strengthen liquidity
regulations for large, systemically significant financial companies. The
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System must promulgate more
stringent liquidity regulations for large bank holding companies and system-
ically important nonbank financial firms than that which is applicable to
other firms, 32 and the Financial Stability Oversight Council has the authority
to recommend that the Board promulgate more stringent liquidity regula-
tion.3 3 Per this grant of authority by Congress, the Board has proposed more
concrete liquidity-risk management regulations;34 however, the new rules
generally leave discretion with financial-firm boards and senior executives
on important liquidity-management decisions,35 the amounts of cash and
liquid securities held,36 and sources of assumed liabilities.37
2. Liquidity Regulation in the European
Union and Its Member States
The precrisis approach of EU member states to liquidity-risk regulation
closely tracked that of the United States. The Capital Requirements Di-
rective ("CRD")38 forms the fundamental EU-wide regulatory framework
28. Federal banking regulators use a uniform rating system for financial institutions
commonly known as CAMELS, an acronym for the phrase Capital adequacy-Asset quality-
Management-Earnings-Liquidity-Sensitivity to market. See Uniform Financial Institutions
Rating System, 61 Fed. Reg. 67,021, 67,022, 67,025 (Dec. 19, 1996).
29. See 12 C.F.R. § 327.9 (2012).
30. Uniform Financial Institutions Rating System, 61 Fed. Reg. at 67,025.
31. CAMELS ratings can appear as part of the FDIC's assessments under 12 C.ER. §
327.9(a)-(c), or as one of seven factors used to calculate the initial base-assessment rates for
the least risky banks per id. § 327.9(d).
32. 12 U.S.C. § 5365(a)(1)(A), (b)(1)(A)(ii) (Supp. V 2011).
33. Id. § 5325(a)(1)(A), (b)(1)(C).
34. See Regulation YY, 77 Fed. Reg. 594, 645-49 (proposed Jan. 5, 2012) (to be codi-
fied at 12 C.F.R. pt. 252).
35. See, e.g., id. at 646-47 (imposing responsibilities on boards and board committees
for liquidity-risk management, including overseeing "liquidity risk management processes";
establishing policies, strategies, and contingency plans; and reviewing management assump-
tions on the firm's liquidity position).
36. See id. at 648.
37. See id.
38. See generally Directive 2006/48/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council
of 14 June 2006 Relating to the Taking Up and Pursuit of the Business of Credit Institutions
(Recast), 2006 O.J. (L 177) 1 [hereinafter Capital Requirements Directive].
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for banking;3 9 the CRD adopts a qualitative approach to liquidity-risk man-
agement, requiring banks to establish appropriate management procedures
and contingency plans.40 As a result, quantitative liquidity regulations that
form part of the Basel III proposal will be new for most of Europe.
41
However, some EU member states have already shifted to a quantitative
approach. The CRD, as a directive of the European Union, is not directly
applicable in EU countries and must be enacted through legislation in each
member state.4 2 This allows for some variation in operational details from
state to state. Going beyond the CRD's requirements, Germany promulgated
a quantitative liquidity ratio in December 2006.41 Germany's regulation re-
quires banks and securities firms to maintain sufficient cash and other assets
readily convertible into cash to satisfy maturing liabilities within the next
one-month period. 44 Banks must also calculate "observation ratios" that
measure the assets available to cover maturing liabilities over the next three-,
six-, and twelve-month periods.45 The United Kingdom updated its liquidity
regulation applicable to banks in September 2009,46 adopting a split approach:
general qualitative standards concerning a firm's liquidity-risk management
processes apply to firms by default, 47 while some firms with uncomplicated
balance sheets may choose to comply instead with a quantitative liquidity
rule .4
8
39. Georgina Peters, Developments in the EU, in CROSS-BORDER BANK INSOLVENCY
128, 129-30 (Rosa M. Lastra ed., 2011).
40. See Capital Requirements Directive, supra note 38, Annex V 14-15, 2006 O.J.
(L 177) at 80 ("Policies and processes for the measurement and management of [credit institu-
tions'] net funding position and requirements on an ongoing and forward-looking basis shall
exist. Alternative scenarios shall be considered and the assumptions underpinning decisions
concerning the net funding position shall be reviewed regularly").
41. See, e.g., Derek Paine, Compliance Manager, J.P. Morgan & Henrik Lang, Liquidity
Product Sales Specialist, J.P. Morgan, Liquidity Regulation in the UK & Europe: Impact on
International Banks and Broker-Dealers 8 (July 7, 2010), available at http:II
www.jpmorgan.com/cm/BlobServer/Liquidity-Regulation-inUK and Europe.pdfblobkey=
id&blobnocache=true&blobwhere=1320537297240&blobheader=application%2Fpdf&
blobcol=urldata&blobtable=MungoBlobs.
42. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
art. 288, Mar. 30, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 47, 172 ("A directive shall be binding, as to the re-
sult to be achieved, upon each Member State to which it is addressed, but shall leave to the
national authorities the choice of form and methods.").
43. See Liquidititsverordnung [LiqV] [Liquidity Regulation], Dec. 14, 2006, BUN-
DESGESETZBLATT, Teil I [BGBL. I] at 3117, § 2 (Ger.).
44. Id. § 2(1).
45. Id. § 2(2).
46. Prudential Sourcebook for Banks, Building Societies and Investment Firms (Li-
quidity) Instrument 2009, FSA 2009/55 (U.K.).
47. Id. arts. 12.3-12.5.
48. Id. art. 12.6.
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3. International Coordination on Liquidity Regulation
The Basel III Liquidity Coverage Ratio is part of the first concrete inter-
national agreement on liquidity to issue from the Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision. First established in 1974, 49 the Basel Committee
works to foster "regular cooperation on banking supervisory matters. 50
Representatives from twenty-seven jurisdictions5' work to harmonize capital
adequacy and other requirements through the Basel process. 52 Recommen-
dations made by the Basel Committee are not binding on nations, and must
be enacted into law in each jurisdiction; countries have no obligation with
the force of law to follow the Basel Committee's recommendations. 53
Though the Committee is known for its work on capital adequacy stand-
ards,54 in September 2008 it released a final set of Principles for Sound
Liquidity Risk Management and Supervision55 and included the LCR in its
Basel III capital adequacy proposal in December 2010.56
Regulators have begun to modify their approach to liquidity regulation
in the aftermath of the recent financial crisis. The LCR and similar quantita-
tive liquidity requirements will, for many countries including the United
States, represent a break from the past. The next Part discusses the extent of
this break and concludes that significant potential exists for market distor-
tions that could work to undermine financial stability.
II. EVALUATING THE BASEL III LIQUIDITY COVERAGE RATIO
In response to the liquidity problems encountered in the recent financial
crisis, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision released a preliminary
proposal for new liquidity requirements in December 2010. 57 Among the
new regulations proposed by the Basel Committee is a requirement to meet
a minimum threshold for short-term liquidity as measured by the LCR. Sec-
49. History of the Basel Committee and Its Membership, BASEL COMM. ON BANKING
SUPERVISION, 1 (Aug. 2009), http://www.bis.org/bcbs/history.pdf.
50. About the Basel Committee, BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS, http://www.bis.org
/bcbs/about.htm (last visited Aug. 29, 2012).
51. Not all members of the Basel Committee are states. For example, the Committee's
membership includes the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Id.
52. Id.
53. See, e.g., Michael S. Barr & Geoffrey P. Miller, Global Administrative Law: The
View from Basel, 17 EUR. J. INT'L L. 15, 23 (2006) (U.K.) ("[T]he Basel process ... results
only in non-binding standards to be implemented at the national level... .
54. About the Basel Committee, supra note 50.
55. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, PRINCIPLES FOR SOUND LIQUIDITY RISK
MANAGEMENT AND SUPERVISION (2008), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs 144.pdf.
56. BASEL I LIQUIDITY FRAMEWORK, supra note 3.
57. Id.
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tion II.A provides a detailed overview of the LCR requirement. Section II.B
explores the implications of the requirement using a simple model of bank
liquidity, and shows how the rule may lead to costly, even unsustainable,
borrowing cycles. Section lI.C considers potential responses to the LCR,
and argues that bank managers are likely to choose a regulatory arbitrage
strategy of compliance that may, in the aggregate, undermine financial sta-
bility.
A. The Basel III Liquidity Coverage Ratio Proposal Defined
The LCR seeks to improve the short-term resilience of financial firms by
requiring that firms be sufficiently liquid to survive a thirty-day scenario of
severe credit-market stress.58 Under the LCR, firms would be required to
keep "high-quality liquid assets" ("HQLA")59 equal to at least 100 percent
of "total net cash outflows"60 over the next thirty calendar days. 61 Expressed
as an equation, the LCR takes the following form62 :
high-quality liquid assets
Liquidity Coverage = > 100%
Ratio total net cash outflows
over 30 days
Firms would report compliance with the LCR on at least a monthly basis,
with more frequent reporting possibly being required in cases of increased
stress.
63
Two categories of assets make up HQLA. The first category, Level 1 as-
sets, includes cash and other assets that may be easily converted to cash in a
stressed situation (for example, statutory reserves and high-quality sover-
eign debt such as U.S. Treasuries).' 4 The full current market value of Level
1 assets is applied to HQLA.65 The second category, Level 2 assets, includes
assets that will likely fetch nearly full value in a stressed situation, such as
low-risk corporate bonds, covered bonds,6 6 and some securities issued by
58. Id. para. 4.
59. For more detail regarding the definition of HQLA, see infra notes 64-71 and ac-
companying text.
60. For more on the computation of total net cash outflows, see infra notes 72-73 and
accompanying text.
61. BASEL III LIQUIDITY FRAMEWORK, supra note 3, para. 15.
62. Id. para. 16.
63. Id. para. 186.
64. See id. para. 40.
65. Id. para. 39.
66. Covered bonds are bonds issued by a financial institution that are secured by a pool
of assets, such as residential mortgages, held on the financial institution's balance sheet. U.S.
DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, BEST PRACTICES FOR RESIDENTIAL COVERED BONDS 7 (2008),
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sovereigns, central banks, and similar entities. 67 Eighty-five percent of the
current market value of Level 2 assets is applied to HQLA,68 and Level 2
assets may make up no more than 40 percent of the total HQLA amount.69
Assets that do not come under Levels 1 or 2 cannot be included in HQLA.70
In all cases, any asset that is counted in HQLA must not be encumbered by
any third-party security interest or kept as a hedge, and must be held on the
firm's own account (that is, customer-held securities cannot be included). 71
"Total net cash outflows" is defined as the sum of outflows over the next
thirty days minus the lesser of inflows and 75% of outflows.72 Thus, total
net cash outflows will be either the firm's projected thirty-day outflows mi-
nus its projected thirty-day inflows or 25% of its projected thirty-day
outflows, whichever is greater. This definition of total net cash outflows lim-
its the degree to which firms may rely on inflows to cover outflows because
in no event will the rule's definition of total net cash outflows be less than
25% of the firm's projected outflows. 73 The liquidity ratio thus forces a firm
to hold liquid assets equal to at least 25% of the dollar volume of its project-
ed outflows.
A bank's most obvious and easy-to-predict outflows are its principal ob-
ligations on borrowings that will mature during the applicable window. Its
inflows consist of the interest it earns on loans and the principal payments
made during the applicable window.74 But more exotic forms of inflows and
outflows exist: for example, unused lines of credit can cause outflows if bor-
rowers choose to draw down,75 and derivatives contracts may give rise to
known receivables, which would count as inflow. 76
The LCR adjusts both inflows and outflows to simulate severe liquidity
stress. For outflows, the rule assigns minimum runoff rates by type of liabil-
ity, with these rates increasing as funding instability increases. 77 For
example, for deposits that are owned by natural persons and fully covered
by a deposit insurance scheme (historically, a stable source of funding), reg-
ulators may assume that as little as 5% of these funds will leave the bank in
available at http://www.treasury.gov/about/organizational-structure/offices/General-Counsel
/Documents/USCoveredBondBestPracticespdf" The U.S. market for these instruments is still
small-as of July 2008, only two U.S. depository institutions had issued covered bonds. See
id. at5.
67. BASEL Im LIQUIDITY FRAMEWORK, supra note 3, paras. 41-42.
68. See id. para. 42 (imposing a 15 percent "haircut").
69. Id. para. 41.
70. See id. para. 35.
71. See id. paras. 26-28.
72. Id. para. 50.
73. Id.
74. E.g., id. paras. 105, 112-114 (including cash inflows from "fully performing"
loans).
75. See id. paras. 93-97.
76. Id. para. 117.
77. See id. paras. 54-87.
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a stress scenario.7 However, for the type of bank borrowing that proved to
be highly unstable during recent financial crises, such as unsecured lending
from other financial institutions, regulators must assume that 75 to 100% of
these funds will be unavailable in a crisis. 79 For inflows, the rule assumes
that in a crisis situation, banks will refuse to roll over loans made to other
financial institutions, and thus they will have available 100% of inflows to
satisfy depositors; as for other customers such as retail borrowers, the rule
assumes that half of all inflows will be lent back to customers as rollovers,
leaving 50% of gross inflows available to satisfy the LCR.8°
The LCR also accounts for outflows that are not captured on the balance
sheet. Firms must include in net outflows 100% of the amount of collateral
or any other cash outflows that would result from a credit downgrade, up to
and including a three-notch downgrade. 81 Firms also must include additional
outflows to reflect the falling value of collateral in a fire sale.82 In addition,
firms must assume that counterparties will draw on outstanding credit and
liquidity facilities, with runoff rates ranging from 5% (in the case of retail
and small business customers) to 100% (in the case of, for example, finan-
cial institutions).83
In sum, the LCR is structured to differentiate between volatile funding
sources, such as wholesale funding, and less volatile sources such as retail
deposits. However, the mechanics of the rule and the wide discrepancy
between the treatment of wholesale and retail deposits could instead under-
mine the stability of banks.
B. The Mechanics of the Liquidity Coverage Ratio
Though the LCR is meant to make firms more resilient and less likely to
fail or require rescue from the government during a financial crisis, this
Note argues that the rule may lead to broad market distortions in the markets
for wholesale funding,84 retail deposits, and bank capital. This is due to what
this Section calls the "snowballing" borrowing requirements of the LCR,
where firms that engage in maturity transformation borrow (and only bor-
row) to satisfy the LCR and face ever-growing borrowing requirements. To
demonstrate this snowballing effect, this Section constructs simple examples
to show how although the LCR does foreclose some funding strategies that
breed systemic risk through interconnectedness (as the Basel Committee
78. See id. para. 56.
79. See id. paras. 81-83.
80. See id. paras. 112-114.
81. Id. para. 89. This provision is largely meant to address the liquidity stresses like
those that led to the bailout of American International Group ("AIG"). See generally FIN.
CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT 344-47 (2011) (attributing
AIG's liquidity problems in part to downgrade-triggered collateral obligations).
82. See BASEL III LIQUIDITY FRAMEWORK, supra note 3, para. 90.
83. See id. paras. 93-97.
84. That is, debt issued to nonretail creditors.
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intended), the LCR also penalizes firms that pursue common competitive
strategies in retail banking, strategies that do not implicate systemic risk
issues. Section II.B. 1 discusses the endlessly increasing borrowing require-
ments for banks that rely exclusively on wholesale funding. Section II.B.2
shows how even a choice to borrow from historically stable funding sources
is "taxed" by the requirement that firms hold a cushion of HQLA in prepara-
tion for severe market conditions.
1. Wholesale Funding and "Snowballing" Borrowing
Example 1. To begin with an extreme example, imagine a bank with
$100 in assets on the first day of Year Zero that will mature on the first day
of Year Thirty. No payments are required before maturity. This bank funds
these long-term assets with $100 in unsecured borrowing from financial
institutions that mature on the first day of Year One. The bank's regulator
requires banks to meet the LCR as measured on the first day of each year.
Assume that the bank has no right to terminate its funding agreement (or
prepay) before the maturity date. The bank also keeps $8 in common stock
and $8 in HQLA. We will assume that the bank will fund any increase in
assets solely with wholesale funding from financial institutions, and that this
new funding will mature at the next period. The bank's balance sheet on the
first day of Year Zero is given as follows:
TABLE 2
EXAMPLE 1: BALANCE SHEET AT YEAR ZERO
Assets Liabilities and Shareholder's Equity
High-Quality Liquid Assets = $8 Wholesale Funding = $100
Long-Term Loans = $100 Common Stock = $8
Total = $108 Total = $108
In the final thirty days of Year Zero, just before the wholesale funding
matures at the beginning of Year One, all $100 of wholesale funding would
count as outflows under the LCR because the rule defines outflows to in-
clude 100 percent of wholesale liabilities maturing in the next thirty days.85
As we have assumed that no payments are due on the loans, there are no
inflows to offset the outflows, making net outflows equal to $100; thus, to
satisfy the ratio, the bank must hold $100 in HQLA. As the bank has only
$8 in such assets, the bank must raise $92 in additional funding to meet the
standard. The bank also rolls over its $100 in maturing funding to fund its
loans. Thus, the bank has a balance sheet at the beginning of Year One as
follows:
85. See BASEL 1]] LIQUIDITY FRAMEWORK, supra note 3, para. 82.
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TABLE 3
EXAMPLE 1 BALANCE SHEET AT YEAR ONE
Assets Liabilities and Shareholder's Equity
High-Quality Liquid Assets = $100 Maturing Wholesale Funding = $100
New Wholesale Funding = $92
Long-Term Loans = $100 Common Stock = $8
Total = $200 Total = $200
Once year one has begun, the bank is flush with liquidity because the
bank has no outflows until the beginning of Year Two. However, due to the
bank's one-term borrowing fixed-funding strategy, it cannot discharge its
obligations early once made. 6
In the final thirty days of Year One, just before the beginning of Year
Two, all $192 of the wholesale funding again counts as outflows under the
LCR. The bank has only $100 in HQLA, and again borrows $92 in the mar-
ket to cover the shortfall. Thus, at the beginning of Year Two, the bank's
balance sheet will have swelled:
TABLE 4
EXAMPLE 1 BALANCE SHEET AT YEAR TWO
Assets Liabilities and Shareholder's Equity
High-Quality Liquid Assets = $192 Maturing Wholesale Funding = $192
New Wholesale Funding = $92
Long-Term Loans = $100 Common Stock = $8
Total = $292 Total = $292
Further iterations of this funding strategy create ever-increasing, or
"snowballing," funding needs when liabilities mature and are replaced with
other liabilities of a similar duration. If the bank is unable to raise this
amount of money in the market, the firm will be unable to satisfy the LCR.
What the LCR fails to reveal, however, is that the bank is still likely to be
liquid, as the incremental borrowing is needed only to build excess HQLA
stock for LCR ratio purposes.
86. If the bank in our example could prepay its debt, it could use its excess HQLA
(because the bank need not report its ratio to the regulator until the beginning of the next year)
to repay its creditors and shrink its balance sheet. However, few banks have the flexibility to
prepay their depositors or other creditors, and I assume here that they do not.
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Though the snowballing effect leads to runaway borrowing when firms
rely solely on wholesale funding, reliance on more stable funding sources
also gives rise to more modest snowballing under the LCR. Consider the
following example.
2. Other Funding Sources and Liquidity "Gross-Ups"
Example 2. Assume a bank on the first day of Year Zero with $100 in
long-term assets that will mature on the first day of Year Thirty, and that no
payments are required before maturity. This bank funds these long-term as-
sets with $100 in retail time deposits 87 that mature on the first day of Year
One.88 The bank also keeps $8 in common stock and $8 in HQLA. As be-
fore, the bank's regulator requires it to meet the LCR as measured on the
first day of each year. We will assume that the bank will fund any increase in
assets solely with additional retail time deposits, and that this new funding
will mature at the next period. The bank's balance sheet on the first day of
Year Zero would look like this:
TABLE 5
EXAMPLE 2 BALANCE SHEET AT YEAR ZERO
Assets Liabilities and Shareholder's Equity
High-Quality Liquid Assets = $8 Retail Time Deposits = $100
Long-Term Loans = $100 Common Stock = $8
Total = $108 Total = $108
Because the LCR requires banks to count at least 10 percent of maturing
retail time deposits as "total net cash outflows"'89 in the thirty days before
the time deposits mature on the first day of Year One, at least $10 would
count as net outflows under the LCR. As we have again assumed that no
payments are due on the loans, the bank must hold $10 in HQLA. As before,
the bank borrows the $2 difference as retail time deposits, and rolls over the
$100 in maturing funding. The bank would now have $102 in retail-time-
deposit funding on the first day of Year One:
87. A time deposit is "[a] bank deposit that is to remain for a specified period or for
which notice must be given to the bank before withdrawal." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 504
(9th ed. 2009).
88. As with the previous example, the bank will have no right to terminate or prepay
this borrowing before maturity.
89. See BASEL III LIQUIDITY FRAMEWORK, supra note 3, paras. 57-64.
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TABLE 6
EXAMPLE 2 BALANCE SHEET AT YEAR ONE
Assets Liabilities and Shareholder's Equity
High-Quality Liquid Assets = $10 Retail Time Deposits = $102
Long-Term Loans = $100 Common Stock = $8
Total = $110 Total = $110
The new borrowing required to satisfy the ratio tapers off after the first
day of Year One, and with further iterations, the HQLA holdings arrive at a
steady-state level, forming a "liquidity cushion." After fifteen iterations, the
balance sheet would look like this:
TABLE 7
EXAMPLE 2 BALANCE SHEET AT YEAR FIFTEEN
Assets Liabilities and Shareholder's Equity
High-Quality Liquid Assets = $10.22 Retail Time Deposits = $102.22
Long-Term Loans = $100 Common Stock = $8
Total = $110.22 Total = $110.22
Unlike Example 1, for funding with runoff rates of less than 100 per-
cent, the rule does not create endlessly snowballing lending but creates
steady-state borrowing cushions that build up over time. The following fig-
ure shows the cushion sizes for each minimum LCR runoff rate90 :
90. Another way to think of these steady-state amounts is as the "gross-up" rates that
would allow banks to meet the LCR without having to return to the market for more funding.
These gross-up rates in practice would depend on other factors such as the loan's amortization
schedules.
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FIGURE 1
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This example shows more clearly the disparity in treatment between un-
secured whole funding and retail, small-business, or public funding.
Institutions that rely too heavily on wholesale funding in any form will have
much greater liquidity needs.
The LCR operates as an effective "tax" on the liabilities of banks in the
form of higher funding requirements for debt borrowed at short terms and
debt that has shown instability in past crises. We would expect such taxes to
provoke a response from banks as they develop a strategically optimal way
to comply with the rule. Some of these strategic responses are discussed in
the next Section.
C. Responses to the Rule
The LCR does not prescribe how firms are to comply with its require-
ments. A straightforward way to comply with the rule would be to acquire
HQLA in the amounts required to satisfy the rule. This is the same strategy
employed by the banks in the examples above in Section II.B. However, this
strategy would likely require banks to raise large amounts of new funding,92
91. To better demonstrate the steady-state cushion values, Figure 1 assumes that the
firns have no cash on hand at t - 0. It can be shown that, given the conditions assumed above,
for t > 2 the curves conform to the general equation:
f(t + 1) -f(t) = A. (f(t) -f(t- ))
where _l> 2 and is the value of the LCR runoff rate. It then follows that limt--f(t) converges
for 0 _< A< 1, and does not for A 2! 1.
92. See, e.g., PHILIPP HARLE ET AL., McKINSEY & Co., BASEL III AND EUROPEAN
BANKING 3 ex.1 (2010) (forecasting that U.S. banks must add the equivalent of 570 billion
euros in short-term funding and 2.2 trillion euros in long-term funding to comply with the
Basel HI liquidity requirements).
!///If"
Basel III Liquidity Coverage Ratio
and some predict that in certain jurisdictions there may not be enough
HQLA for all banks to satisfy the rule.93 Thus, one might expect banks to
adjust their capital structures to comply with the rule at the least cost to
them.
9 4
Companies have three "degrees of freedom" when changing their capital
structures to comply with the rule: first, banks may "deleverage," or choose
to fund with equity rather than debt; second, banks may pursue a "mismatch
reduction" strategy by increasing the average maturity of their borrowing
(i.e., begin borrowing for longer terms); and third, banks may engage in
"regulatory arbitrage" by changing the sources of their borrowing from
higher-taxed to lower-taxed sources of funding. Companies may choose one
or a combination of the above strategies when adjusting their capital struc-
tures to comply with the LCR.
Though it is difficult to predict which strategy companies are likely to
choose, each strategy has a different set of associated costs and benefits, and
different barriers to implementation. The following Sections discuss these
response strategies in turn: Section II.C. I discusses the deleveraging option
and concludes that few banks would be expected under classical theories of
bank capital structure to increase equity levels voluntarily to insure against
illiquidity. Section II.C.2 evaluates the mismatch-reduction option and con-
cludes that few banks would have the flexibility in borrowing terms to adopt
such a strategy. Section II.C.3 analyzes the regulatory-arbitrage option and
argues that many banks are likely to choose this strategy and compete with
one another for the retail demand deposits that receive favorable treatment
under the LCR. I argue that this third strategy, though likely the most attrac-
tive of the above alternatives for a typically situated bank acting alone, leads
to aggregate consequences that may undermine systemic financial stability.
1. Option One: Deleveraging
One strategy to satisfy the LCR's snowballing borrowing requirements
is to reduce leverage-that is, fund the business not with debt but with
common stock and other equity instruments that do not mature. This strategy
works because, as a residual claim on the value of the firm, common equity
never matures, and would never form a part of "net outflows" under the
93. See, e.g., AUSTL. PRUDENTIAL REGULATION AUTH., IMPLEMENTING BASEL III
LIQUIDITY REFORMS IN AUSTRALIA 8 (2011), available at http://www.apra.gov.au/adi
/Documents/ADIDPIBLRNovember_201 1.pdf ("As is well recognised, the supply of
[high-quality liquid assets] in Australia is insufficient to meet the Australian dollar liquidity
requirements of [institutions covered by the LCR].").
94. Banks could also decide to comply with the rule by increasing short-term non-
readily-marketable assets, such as credit-card receivables. Because contractual inflows from
fully performing outstanding exposures reduce net cash outflows, see BASEL IIl LIQUIDITY
FRAMEWORK, supra note 3, para. 105, this strategy reduces the size of the ratio's denominator,
thereby increasing the quotient and improving the bank's ratio. However, this strategy would
adjust a bank's portfolio of assets and thus the bank's credit risks. The strategy's success
would therefore depend on market particulars. A discussion of this strategy is beyond the
scope of this Note.
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LCR.95 Some scholars have called for firms to hold capital against the risk
of illiquidity,96 in effect forcing firms to adopt this manner of substitution.
This kind of substitution would bring about an immediate and direct im-
provement to the resilience of the financial system. More capital gives firms
a larger buffer to absorb losses due to eroding asset values. Increased capital
also lowers leverage, and excessive leverage among investment banks and
government-sponsored enterprises worsened the crisis in the United States. 7
However, few banks would be expected under the classical theories of
bank capital structure to increase equity levels voluntarily to insure against
illiquidity. First, banks are thought to prefer to fund their activities with debt
rather than equity. One explanation for this preference arises from "pecking
order" theory, which posits that the informational asymmetries between
managers of a firm and external investors drive managers to choose internal
financing over debt, and debt over equity.98 Another key reason is deposit
insurance, which shifts some of the costs of bank failure from depositors to
the deposit insurance fund." If regulators did not shift the costs of deposit
insurance back to banks, these banks would enjoy a subsidy for debt financ-
ing. Evidence from the recent crisis suggests that U.S. deposit insurance was
underpriced, at least during the decade before the crisis.Il° Increasing equity
may lower return on equity in the short term, a key measure of corporate
performance, or may be unacceptable to current shareholders who are un-
willing to dilute their holdings.
95. See supra text accompanying note 48.
96. See, e.g., MARKUS BRUNNERMEIER ET AL., THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF
FINANCIAL REGULATION 45-48 (Geneva Reports on the World Econ. No. 11, 2009).
97. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, supra note 81, at xix to xx.
98. RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE
524-27 (7th ed. 2003).
99. See, e.g., Robert C. Merton, An Analytic Derivation of the Cost of Deposit Insur-
ance and Loan Guarantees: An Application of Modern Option Pricing Theory, I J. BANKING
& FIN. 3 (1977) (framing deposit insurance as a put option on a bank's liabilities, and using
the Black-Scholes option pricing formula to analyze the value of that option to a bank). Nearly
all countries have some form of deposit insurance. See Ash Demirgiiq-Kunt et al., Deposit
Insurance Around the World: A Comprehensive Database, in DEPOSIT INSURANCE AROUND
THE WORLD 363, 364 (Asli Demirgtiq-Kunt et al. eds., 2008) (identifying 181 countries with
either an explicit or implicit deposit insurance scheme).
100. The most compelling evidence of underpriced deposit insurance is the failure of the
Deposit Insurance Fund to satisfy all benefit claims arising from the failures of insured institu-
tions. The Fund showed a negative balance from the third quarter of 2009 to the second
quarter of 2011. See Quarterly Banking Profile: Second Quarter 2011, 5 FDIC Q. (Fed. De-
posit Ins. Corp., Washington, D.C.), no. 3, 2011, at 1, 17 tbl.I-B. A factor that likely
contributed to this shortfall was statutory requirements that capped the size of the fund and
prohibited the FDIC from collecting deposit insurance premiums from the lowest risk banks
once the fund reached the size limit. Viral V. Acharya et al., Systemic Risk and Deposit Insur-
ance Premiums, FRBNY ECON. POL'Y REv. (Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y.C.), Aug. 2010, at 89,
91. As a result, the FDIC did not collect premiums from the majority of banks from 1996 to
2006. Id.
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2. Option Two: Mismatch Reduction
Banks may also comply with the LCR through "mismatch reduction," or
increasing the length of borrowing terms from existing sources of fund-
ing.' 0' This strategy works because longer-term borrowing would mature in
the LCR's thirty-day window less often than shorter-term debt, and the
"snowballing" borrowing described above"0 2 would occur more gradually,
giving banks more time to arrange for more stable funding sources. Extend-
ing the borrowing periods would also allow banks to enjoy more inflow
deductions from net outflows, thus lowering net outflows and dampening
the effects of the rule.
Financial stability would likely improve if banks were to shift their capi-
tal structures in this way. Some of the most egregious failures of the recent
financial crisis were those of firms that funded long-term illiquid assets with
short-term, highly volatile debt-a prominent example is Northern Rock, a
thrift-like financial institution in the United Kingdom, whose failure was
accelerated by its reliance on wholesale funding. 103
However, many banks would be unable to adopt this strategy. Most im-
portantly, banks likely have little flexibility to extend the terms of borrowing
from their existing creditors. Banks funded in large part with wholesale lia-
bilities-the institutions that suffer the largest penalties under the LCR and
would be under the greatest pressure to revamp their capital structure-are
among the least likely to succeed in increasing average borrowing terms,
because most financial institutions that lend surplus funds to other banks are
themselves vulnerable to liquidity stresses or runs. Lender banks would ra-
tionally seek to operate such funds at short terms so that they could be used
as a buffer during a crisis. As for banks funded mainly through retail depos-
its, these banks would also struggle to increase borrowing terms because
demand deposits and time deposits are not substitutes for one another: con-
sumers hold demand deposits in large part to access payment systems,
which would no longer be possible if funds were instead held in longer-term
time deposits.
Also, such a strategy would cause bank profitability to suffer due to in-
creased interest expense. In a normal interest rate environment, borrowing
long term is more expensive than borrowing short term.' ° An increase in
funding cost would lower the bank's net interest margin, operating profit,
and return on capital. Thus, bank executives would likely be reluctant to
adopt such a strategy as a first choice.
101. This Section assumes that banks borrow from the same sources. For a discussion of
the effects of a shift among funding sources, see infra Section lI.C.3.
102. See supra Section RLB.
103. See NAT'L AUDIT OFFICE, HM TREASURY: THE NATIONALISATION OF NORTHERN
ROCK, 2008-9, H.C. 298, at 13-14 (U.K.), available at http://www.nao.org.uk
/publications/0809/northern-rock.aspx (click on "Full Report" link); Hyun Song Shin, Reflec-
tions on Northern Rock: The Bank Run that Heralded the Global Financial Crisis, J. ECON.
PERSP., Winter 2009, at 101, 107-10.
104. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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3. Option Three: Regulatory Arbitrage
A third way to comply with the LCR is through regulatory arbitrage:
shifting borrowing from sources with unfavorable treatment under the rule,
such as wholesale funding, to sources with favorable treatment, such as re-
tail deposits. This would lower the applicable runoff ratio with respect to
those maturing liabilities, thereby reducing net cash outflows, and increas-
ing the ratio given a fixed level of HQLA.
Banks may find that this alternative is the most attractive among those
discussed here. First, increasing retail deposits, especially non-interest-
bearing demand deposits, may increase bank profitability by lowering the
bank's average cost of funds. Also, attracting new depositors to banks gives
an opportunity to sell other banking products, such as loans or transaction
services, to more customers and thereby increase income.
Moreover, such a strategy does not necessarily require expensive in-
vestments in systems, staff, and real estate; banks could compete on price
instead. The "direct" banking model is an example of a low-capital-
expenditure, price-led business strategy targeting retail depositors." 5 One
well-known adherent to the direct banking strategy was the Icelandic bank
Landsbanki, which rapidly built a deposit book through its U.K. branch un-
der the "Icesave" name. 10 6 Another well-known example is ING Bank fsb, or
"ING Direct," which held $82 billion in deposits as of June 30, 2011, mak-
ing it the fifteenth-largest insured depository institution in the United States
despite its very small branch network. 107 In many ways, direct banks offer a
product similar to that of money market mutual funds ("MMFs"), whereby
customers trade a modicum of transactional convenience for higher re-
turns. 
108
Though such a strategy may make sense at the individual-firm level, a
shift in this direction has strong negative implications for overall financial
105. For an explanation of the direct banking model, see Brian A. Johnson et al., Bank-
ing on Multimedia, McKINSEY Q., no. 2, 1995, at 94 (describing the "multimedia bank").
106. See Mark J. Flannery, Iceland's Failed Banks: A Post-Mortem, in 9
RANNSOKNARNEFND ALIPINGIS [SPECIAL INVESTIGATION COMM'NJ, ADDRAGANDI OG ORSAKIR
FALLS ISLENSKU BANKANNA 2008 OG TENGDIR ATBURDIR [BACKGROUND AND CAUSES OF THE
COLLAPSE OF ICELANDIC BANKS IN 2008 AND RELATED EVENTS] app. 3 at 89, 100 & fig.6
(2009) (Ice.), available at http://www.rannsoknarnefnd.is/pdf/RNABindi9.pdf (stating that
Landsbanki's U.K. branch raised over 4 billion pounds sterling in deposits after only one year
of operations).
107. Top 50 Commercial Banks and Savings Institutions by Total Domestic Deposits,
FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., http://www2.fdic.gov/sod/index.asp (follow "Summary Tables"
hyperlink; then follow "Top 50 Commercial Banks and Savings Institutions by Total Domestic
Deposits" hyperlink) (data as of June 30, 2011). ING Direct has only one deposit-taking of-
fice. Id.
108. MMF investors also forfeit deposit insurance protection. See PRESIDENT'S WORK-
ING GRP. ON FIN. MKTS., MONEY MARKET FUND REFORM OPTIONS 8 (2010) ("[M]any retail
customers likely consider MMF shares and bank deposits [to be] near substitutes, even if the
two classes of products are fundamentally different (most notably because MMF shares are
not insured and because MMFs and banks are subject to very different regulatory regimes).").
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stability. The favorable treatment of retail deposits is justified on the basis of
the stability of such deposits, even in times of extreme financial stress.
Though ordinarily retail deposits are stable in a crisis, this may not hold true
for retail depositors who are underinsured-that is, who have deposits in
excess of the deposit insurance coverage limits. These large-volume deposi-
tors are those with the greatest incentives to move to higher-yielding savings
products, and to flee to safer products in times of crisis.
Evidence from the 2007-2008 financial crisis supports the idea that
these "hot" retail deposits do not exhibit the stability normally attributed to
retail deposits. Underinsured depositors were primarily responsible for the
withdrawal of $9.4 billion from Seattle-based thrift Washington Mutual
("WaMu") during a two-week period in July 2008.109 A second run in Sep-
tember 2008 led the Office of Thrift Supervision, WaMu's primary federal
regulator, to place WaMu into Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
("FDIC") receivership. 110 From June 30 to September 25, 2008, WaMu lost
$13.6 billion in retail deposits,"' in large part due to a loss of depositor
confidence."12 U.S. MMFs-for which no investor insurance scheme exist-
ed-also suffered runs in September 2008, and the U.S. Department of the
Treasury and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System were
forced to make "unprecedented ... interventions ' 13 to stabilize the mar-
ket, 11 including a blanket guarantee. "15 In the United Kingdom,
Landsbanki's Icesave suffered a debilitating bank run in September 2008
due to concerns that Iceland's deposit insurance fund could not satisfy de-
positor claims in the case of the bank's failure. 1' 6 In view of this track
109. Kirsten Grind, The Downfall of Washington Mutual, PUGET SOUND Bus. J., Sept. 28,
2009, http://www.bizjoumals.com/seattle/stories/2009/09/28/storyl.html?page=all ("[M]ost of
the money withdrawn during the July bank run lacked FDIC coverage, because it exceeded the
$100,000 limit at the time.").
110. Id.; see also OFFICES OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, FED. DEPOSIT
INS. CORP., REP. No. EVAL-10-002, EVALUATION OF FEDERAL REGULATORY OVERSIGHT OF
WASHINGTON MUTUAL BANK 13 (2010) [hereinafter REGULATORY OVERSIGHT OF WASING-
TON MUTUAL], available at http://www.fdicoig.gov/reportslO/10-OO2EV.pdf.
111. As of June 30, 2008, WaMu held $148.3 billion in retail deposits. Wash. Mut., Inc.,
Quarterly Report Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 for
the Quarterly Period Ended June 30, 2008 (Form 10-Q), at 54 (Aug. 11, 2008). By September
25, 2008, this amount had dropped to $134.7 billion. REGULATORY OVERSIGHT OF WASHING-
TON MUTUAL, supra note 110, at 62.
112. See Grind, supra note 109 ("WaMu's deposit team and liquidity managers watched
as billions flew out of the bank, from all areas of the country. They estimated that the FDIC
insurance covered more than half of the money that fled. It didn't matter. Like the Great De-
pression, customers acted purely out of fear.").
113. PRESIDENT'S WORKING GRP. ON FIN. MKTS., supra note 108, at 12.
114. See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, supra note 81, at 358-59; PRESIDENT'S WORKING
GRP. ON FIN. MKTS., supra note 108, at 11-13.
115. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Treasury Announces Guaranty Program
for Money Market Funds (Sept. 19, 2008), available at http://www.treasury.gov
/press-center/press-releases/Pages/hp 1 147.aspx.
116. Flannery, supra note 106, at 106.
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record, it is unclear why these "less stable" retail deposits, particularly
deposits belonging to underinsured depositors, should receive treatment
under the rule that is significantly more favorable than that of wholesale
funding.
Moreover, if competition for retail deposits increases, prices could rise
to a level where customers are more sensitive to changes in price, undermin-
ing stability."I7 Though bank customers in the United States and other
countries appear to choose banks primarily on the basis of factors other than
price, such as convenience," 8 it is unclear what would happen if retail bank-
ing markets were disrupted by a bank with an aggressive price strategy. The
successes of MMFs, ING Direct, and Landsbanki in attracting some seg-
ments of retail depositors indicate that some depositors will respond to
increased prices. A permanent environment of increased prices could cause
a similar increase in customer price sensitivity, thus leading to an irreparable
deterioration in the stability of retail deposits.
Some may argue that, despite the possibility of runs at a few high-risk
banks like WaMu, deposit insurance has made the probability of a system-
wide panic in the traditional banking system highly remote. Congress has
increased the insured amounts under the federal deposit insurance
scheme," 9 and should even these higher insurance levels fail to stop a mar-
ket-wide run, the U.S. government has shown that it is willing to extend
unlimited guarantees when threatened with a panic. 2° Clearly such guaran-
tees are effective at stopping market-wide panics once in motion. But ex
post interventions treat the symptoms of financial instability and ignore the
disease. Effective ex ante regulation is an important component of a suite of
actions to prevent and deal with financial crises,' 2' and its weaknesses
should not be rationalized by the existence of bailouts.
In the preceding Part, the mechanics of the LCR were explored using a
simple model of bank liquidity. Though the model makes several
simplifying assumptions and explores only a single-minded strategy of
HQLA increases to meet the rule's requirements, it demonstrates the
17. In other words, the LCR's effect on the supply curve could move the equilibrium
price for retail deposits to a region on the demand curve where demand is more price elastic.
118. See Charles Blankson et al., Detenninants of Bank Selection in USA, Taiwan and
Ghana, 25 INT'L J. BANK MARKETING 469,480 tbl.V (2007).
119. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection (Dodd-Frank) Act,
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 335, 124 Stat. 1376, 1540 (2010) (amending Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Act § 1 I(a)(1)(E), 12 U.S.C. § 1821(a)(1)(E) (2006 & Supp. V 2011)).
120. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 370.4 (2011) (guaranteeing in full all non-interest-bearing
transaction accounts); see also supra text accompanying note 115 (money market mutual
funds).
121. See Sachs, supra note 10, at 261 ("[T]he governing principle for emergency interna-
tional support should be a combination of ex ante prudential standards to avoid moral hazard
. and] timely lending to avert or stem a panic .... ").
[Vol. 111:453
Basel III Liquidity Coverage Ratio
disparate treatment of wholesale and retail funding under the LCR. Alter-
native strategies for complying with the LCR by adjusting capital structure
were discussed, and the costs and benefits of these options for both indi-
vidual firms and market stability (as informed by prevailing economic
theory) were evaluated. In view of the above calculus, this Part argued that
bank managers may be tempted to choose the regulatory-arbitrage strategy
as the least punitive and most growth-oriented of the strategies available;
however, a market-wide shift to adopt this strategy may erode the stability
of the deposits, undermining the very reason that retail deposits enjoy
preferential treatment under the LCR.
III. CASE STUDY: REPUBLIC OF KOREA
The preceding Part argued that the LCR as proposed could increase
competition for retail deposits and other deposits with favorable treatment
under the rule, which could undermine the stability of these deposits and
increase the risk in the financial system. The analysis relied largely on
insights from neoclassical economic theory. This Part supplements this
theoretical investigation with some empirical evidence; in particular, this
Part discusses the response by banks in the Republic of Korea to liquidity
regulations promulgated in the wake of the Asian financial crisis of the
late 1990s. 122 Section III.A argues that the lessons from Korea's crisis and
its subsequent financial reforms are highly relevant to today's international
financial reform efforts due to the fundamental similarity between the Ko-
rean and U.S. financial crises. Section III.B describes Korea's postcrisis
reforms with respect to liquidity regulation, showing that overly prescrip-
tive liquidity regulation of a type similar to that of the LCR was
responsible for market distortions, eventually leading regulators to relax
the regulations.
A. Comparing the Korean and U.S. Financial Crises
The Republic of Korea suffered through a debilitating economic period
as part of the larger Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s. The Korean
economy developed quickly in the four decades after the Korean War
through a close relationship between the government and industry, espe-
cially the jaebeol, or large commercial conglomerates.12 a However, the
country's rapid growth obscured fundamental weaknesses in loan under-
writing that allowed overinvestment in some industrial sectors.124 This led
122. For an overview of the Republic of Korea's modem economic development and the
late-1990s financial crisis, see TERENCE C. HALLIDAY & BRUCE G. CARRUTHERS, BANKRUPT:
GLOBAL LAWMAKING AND SYSTEMIC FINANCIAL CRISIS 212-15 (2009).
123. Yoon Je Cho, The Financial Crisis in Korea: Causes and Challenges, in 7 RISING
TO THE CHALLENGE IN ASIA: A STUDY OF FINANCIAL MARKETS 1, 3 (Asian Dev. Bank 1999).
124. See id. at 5; see also Letter from Kyung-shik Lee, Governor, Bank of Korea, and
Chang-Yuel Lim, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Fin. & Econ., Republic of Korea, to
Michel Camdessus, Managing Dir., Int'l Monetary Fund, at attachment para. 4 (Dec. 3, 1997)
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to a string of large corporate bankruptcies, saddling the financial sector
with large portfolios of nonperforming loans. 125 Korean bank regulation
had been lax, 2 6 and Korean banks were vulnerable due to risks from ma-
turity transformation (borrowing short-term to lend long-term) and
currency mismatch (borrowing in one currency to lend in another). 2 The
Thai currency crisis created regional scarcity in short-term borrowing,
eventually compelling Korea to apply for assistance from the International
Monetary Fund. 128
Though the Korean and U.S. financial crises appear superficially very
different, a closer inspection shows that the two arose from similar causes,
unfolded through similar sequences of events, and led to convergent regu-
latory structures. Due to these similarities, the lessons of Korea's
postcrisis path to reform are readily applicable to the international process
of liquidity-regulation reform prompted by the 2007-2008 financial crisis.
Though each crisis was the result of a complex interconnection of
causes,129 a close look at the Korean and U.S. financial crises reveals sev-
eral important shared attributes. Korean and U.S. financial institutions
were saddled with solvency issues in the years immediately preceding
each crisis: in Korea's case, these issues arose from nonperforming com-
mercial loans to jaebeol; "' similarly, in the United States, poorly
underwritten residential mortgage assets infected the financial system.'
Also, in each case, these underlying solvency problems were in part
masked by strong economic performance and asset bubbles. 132 Firms in
[hereinafter Letter of Intent], available at http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/loi/120397.htm
(describing the role of highly leveraged corporate bankruptcies in financial sector failures).
125. Letter of Intent, supra note 124, at attachment para. 4.
126. Id. at attachment para. 5.
127. See SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, 13 BANKERS: THE WALL STREET TAKEOVER
AND THE NEXT FINANCIAL MELTDOWN 42-43 (2010).
128. Id. at 43-45.
129. BYUNG-TAE KiM, KOREA'S BANKING LAW REFORM: POST ASIAN CRISIS 16 (2003)
("[M]ultiple factors combined and interconnected under Korea's specific banking circum-
stance."); see FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, supra note 81, at xvii to xxv (giving several
conclusions on factors contributing to the 2007-2008 U.S. financial crisis).
130. Joon-Ho Hahm & Frederic S. Mishkin, The Korean Financial Crisis: An Asymmet-
ric Information Perspective, I EMERGING MARKETS REV. 21, 35 tbl.6 (2000) (quantifying the
dramatic increase in "latent" nonperforming loans on large Korean-bank balance sheets from
1995 to 1998).
131. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, supra note 81, at 256 (noting that large mortgage
losses "strained [large financial institutions'] capital and cash reserves").
132. Compare Ajai Chopra et al., From Crisis to Recovery in Korea: Strategy, Achieve-
ments, and Lessons 4 (Int'l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. WP/01/154, 2001) (noting
that Korea's dramatic economic growth masked its structural weaknesses), and Letter of In-
tent, supra note 124, at attachment para. 5 (mentioning the drop in stock prices as a further
cause of bank-equity erosion), with FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, supra note 81, at 84-88,
213-15 (describing the "stabilizing" effect of rising house prices in the U.S. economy, and the
subsequent bust).
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both countries relied heavily on stable market prices for liquidity,133 and
each country was populated by "too-big-to-fail" institutions.'34
Also, the two crises played out in similar ways. In 1997, the Korean
crisis peaked when excessive maturity transformation in foreign-currency-
denominated assets, especially among merchant banks, could no longer be
sustained;'35 many large U.S. broker-dealers had similarly large maturity
mismatches that created funding problems when credit markets collapsed
in September 2008.136 Additionally, both crises worsened when credit-rating
downgrades-and the threat of downgrades-led to sudden liquidity scar-
city (or threat of scarcity). 13 7
Also, the strong parallels between Korea's postcrisis bank regulatory
structure and the current U.S. structure can increase confidence in the use of
Korea as a bellwether for the current crisis. Korea patterned its postcrisis
reform agenda on the U.S. and then-prevailing international financial regula-
tory standards. Korea implemented its own bank-holding-company law that
hewed closely to the U.S. bank-holding-company regulatory framework,
including similar provisions on ownership,'38 definitions of permissible
133. In the Korean case, financial institutions relied on a U.S.-dollar currency peg for
some funding, which led to liquidity strains when the peg could no longer be defended.
Seonuk Park, Reforming the Korean Banking System After the IMF Era - A Proposal for a
Market Driven Approach, CURRENTS: INT'L TRADE L.J., Summer 2007, at 23, 28-29; see also
KIM, supra note 129, at 17; Hahm & Mishkin, supra note 130, at 29 tbl.2, 30 (describing the
large external borrowings relative to foreign currency reserves, and describing this as a "structur-
al vulnerability"); Bang Nam Jeon, From the 1997-98 Asian Financial Crisis to the 2008-09
Global Economic Crisis: Lessons from Korea's Experience, 5 E. ASIA L. REv. 103, 112 (2010)
(describing currency mismatch as one leg of a "double mismatch" problem). In the U.S. case,
firms relied heavily on pricing stability among mortgage-backed securities for short-term lend-
ing. See Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Securitized Banking and the Run on Repo, 104 J.
FIN. EcON. 425 (2012).
134. In Korea, jaebeol enjoyed implicit government guarantees, JOHNSON & KWAK, supra
note 127, at 42, and were eventually rescued by the government despite assurances of no
bailouts. See, e.g., Todd A. Gormley et a]., Ending "Too Big to Fail": Government Promises vs.
Investor Perceptions 2-3 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 17,518, 2011). In
the United States, these problems were in the financial sector. See, e.g., Does the Dodd-Frank Act
End "Too Big to Fail?": Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. & Consumer Credit of the
H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112th Cong. 59 (2011) (statement of Michael S. Barr, Professor, Uni-
versity of Michigan Law School) (remarking that the problems at Bear Steams, Lehman
Brothers, AIG, and other substantially interconnected financial firms "left the government with
the untenable choice between taxpayer-funded bailouts and financial collapse").
135. Cho, supra note 123, at 10-l l; Hahm & Mishkin, supra note 130, at 43 ("The ab-
sence of prudential regulations on the liquidity position of merchant banking corporations and
resulting maturity mismatch problems for foreign assets and liabilities played a critical role in
triggering the currency crisis in December 1997.").
136. See Markus K. Brunnermeier, Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit Crunch 2007-
2008, 3. ECON. PERSP., Winter 2009, at 77, 80.
137. Compare JOHNSON & KWAK, supra note 127, at 43, and Letter of Intent, supra note
124, at attachment para. 5, with FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, supra note 81, at 344-47.
138. Compare geumyung jiju hoesa beop [Financial Holding Companies Act] [FHCA],
Act No. 6274, Oct. 23, 2000, as amended, art. 8 (S. Kor.), translated in 11(11) STATUTES OF
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activities,3 9 limits on covered transactions with affiliates, 140 approval re-
quirements for mergers, 141 and supervisory authority. 142 Korea also
implemented a capital-adequacy supervisory framework modeled on the
"prompt corrective action" statute from the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 ("FDICIA").143 And Korea moved
quickly after the crisis to adopt the international best practices of bank
supervision promulgated by the Basel Committee.' 44
B. FSS 105 and Market Distortions
In response to the liquidity problems that ultimately led to contagion
and systemic crisis, the Korean government pledged to strengthen liquidity
regulation for commercial and merchant banks. 145 In 1998, the Financial
Supervisory Service ("FSS"), Korea's consolidated financial regulator,
enacted a local-currency liquidity standard, enforced as of the end of every
quarter, that required banks to hold "assets with residual tenor of three
months or fewer" in an amount equal to at least 100 percent of "liabilities
THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA 965 to 965-86 (Korea Legislation Research Inst. 1997 & Supp. 48),
with 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841(a)(1)-(2), 1842(a) (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
139. Compare FHCA arts. 15-19, with 12 U.S.C. § 1843(a).
140. Compare FHCA art. 48, with Federal Reserve Act § 23A, 12 U.S.C. § 371c.
141. Compare FHCA arts. 60-63, with 12 U.S.C. § 1842.
142. Compare FHCA arts. 49-59, and geumyung jiju hoesa beop gamdok gyujeong
[Regulations on Supervision of Financial Holding Companies], Fin. Servs. Comm'n Decree
No. 2000-116, Dec. 29, 2000, as amended, with Regulation Y, 12 C.F.R. pt. 225 (2012).
143. Compare eunhaeng eop gamdok gyujeong [Gyujeong] [Regulation on Supervision
of Banking Business], Fin. Servs. Comm'n Decree No. 2000-118, Dec. 29, 2000, as amended,
arts. 33-37, with 12 U.S.C. § 183 1o. For more on the prompt corrective action scheme's moti-
vations, see Park, supra note 133, at 34-35.
144. See Letter from Chol-Hwan Chon, Governor, Bank of Korea, and Kyu-sung Lee,
Minister of Fin. & Econ., Republic of Korea, to Michel Camdessus, Managing Dir., Int'l
Monetary Fund, at attachment (May 2, 1998), available at http://www.imf.org/extemal/np
1loi/050298.htm (pledging to issue for comment by mid-1999 rules to bring the country into
compliance with the Basel Committee's Core Principles for Effective Bank Supervision, re-
leased in 1997).
145. See id. (promising to implement by mid-1999 requirements for internal liquidity
management systems, reporting of maturity mismatches, maintenance of positive short-term
mismatches, and public release of foreign-currency liquidity data).
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with residual tenor of three months or fewer."14 6 This is expressed in equa-
tion form as follows147 :
assets with residual tenor of3 months or fewer
Local-Currency = months>or fewer 100%
Liquidity Ratio liabilities with residual tenor
of 3 months or fewer
This formulation closely mirrors the equation for the LCR. 14 8 The Kore-
an liquidity ratio's numerator included cash, marketable securities, and
expected inflows from loans as "short-term assets."' 14 9 These categories cor-
respond broadly to the definitions of HQLA and cash inflows under the
LCR. 5° The Korean liquidity ratio's denominator included maturing liabili-
ties and a portion of demand deposits as "short-term liabilities," 151
corresponding to the LCR's outflows, which are usually composed of matur-
ing liabilities.' 52 Beginning in March 2002, the FSS began enforcing a
"precautionary" ratio for banks that failed to maintain a local-currency li-
quidity ratio of at least 105 percent, 53 known colloquially as "FSS 105."
Around the time of the precautionary ratio's promulgation, Korean
banks began competing with each other in the domestic mortgage market,
and greatly increased the size and scale of their maturity transformation.
The Korean mortgage market nearly tripled in size over four years, growing
from just over 85 trillion Korean won, or $73.9 billion, in 2002 to 200
146. See eunhaeng gamdok gyujeong [1998 Gyujeong] [Regulation on Supervision of
Banks], Apr. 1, 1998, as amended Nov. 27, 1998, art. 29(1)(2) (repealed 2000) (current ver-
sion at Gyujeong art. 26(l)(2)); eunhaeng gamdok eommu sihaeng sechik [1999 Sechik]
[Detailed Regulations on Supervision of Banks], Apr. 1, 1998, as amended Mar. 26, 1999, app.
2 (repealed 2000) (current version at eunhaeng eop gamdok eommu sihaeng sechik [Detailed
Regulations on Supervision of Banking Business], Dec. 20,2000, as amended, app. 3-4). Prior to
this version of the rule, banks were required to hold liquid assets (e.g., cash, notes, government
bonds, and some interbank lending) equal to 30 percent of deposits. 1998 Gyujeong art.
29(1)(2); eunhaeng gamdok eommu sihaeng sechik [Detailed Regulations on Supervision of
Banks], Apr. 1, 1998, app. 2 (repealed 2 000).
147. 1999 Sechik app. 2.
148. Compare supra text accompanying note 62, with supra text accompanying note
147.
149. 1999 Sechik app. 2.
150. Compare supra notes 64-71 and accompanying text, with supra text accompanying
note 149.
151. 1999 Sechik app. 2.
152. See supra notes 72-83 and accompanying text.
153. Press Release, Fin. Supervisory Serv., wonhwa yudongseong biyul jedo gaeseon
[Improvements to Won-Denominated Liquidity Ratio Regulations] (July 27, 2006),
available at http://www.fss.or.kr/fss/kr/promo/bodobbs-view.jsp?seqno=l 1303&no=2&
s_title= -A-8 1-*&s kind=title&page=l. Expressed using terms defined in Section II.B.2
above, the rule's ratio had a A of 1.05. This gives rise to a nonconvergent "snowballing" condi-
tion. See supra note 91.
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trillion Korean won, or $173.9 billion, by mid-2006. 15 4 Banks funded this
growth mostly with one- to two-year time deposits.155 This created signifi-
cant maturity transformation, as one-year time deposits funded ten-year and
longer mortgage assets.
This liquidity transformation, coupled with FSS 105, provided the in-
gredients necessary for market distortions and reduced stability. Korean
banks chose to satisfy FSS 105 by borrowing again and again from the one-
year retail time-deposit market, and had to raise 105 cents on the dollar with
each rollover. 156 Borrowing snowballed over several years, which ignited
competition for the time deposits needed to meet FSS 105: as banks scram-
bled to bring in sufficient deposits and competed with each other on price,
the spreads of one- to two-year time-deposit rates over the overnight call
rate grew sharply during 2005 and the first half of 2006.157
In view of these distortions, the FSS eliminated the precautionary ratio
in July 2006.158 The FSS expressly referred to the precautionary ratio's mar-
ket distortions in its decision to discontinue the standard.'5 9 The reporting
period was shortened from every three months to every month. 160 The abol-
ishment of the precautionary ratio left the FSS to enforce the background
local-currency liquidity ratio and dropped the effective ratio from 105 per-
154. Chae-Sun Chung, Korea Hous. Fin. Corp., Integrating Price Dynamics in the Pru-
dential Norms: The Korean Example, HOUSING FIN. INFO. NETWORK 4 (May 26, 2010),
http://hofinet.org/documents/doc.aspx?id=244 (click on "Download Document" link). To
ensure comparability of the figures across time, all Korean won amounts have been converted
to U.S. dollars at the rate of 1150.15 Korean won to one dollar, the U.S. Department of the
Treasury Reporting Rate of Exchange as of December 31, 2011. See Treasury Reporting Rate
of Exchange as of March 31, 2012, FIN. MGMT. SERVICE, http://fms.treas.gov/intn.html#rates
(last updated Apr. 13, 2012).
155. In January 2002, just over half of all fixed deposits had a contractual maturity be-
tween one and two years. See Economic Statistics System, BANK OF KOREA,
http://ecos.bok.or.kr/ (click "English" button; then follow "3.1 Deposits" hyperlink; then click
"3.1.4 Time Deposits by Term (CBs and SBs, End of)"; then click the check box next to each
detailed item under the "Total" folder; then click "Download") (data retrieved Nov. 4, 2011)
(giving that depository banks held 118.0 trillion won in one- to two-year fixed deposits and
103.4 trillion won in fixed deposits of all other tenors). By December 2005, this proportion
had grown to three-fourths. See id. (193.2 trillion won and 67.9 trillion won, respectively).
156. See supra notes 153, 155.
157. Compare BANK OF KOREA, supra note 155 (click "4.2.1.1 Based on Newly Extend-
ed"; then click the check box next to each detailed item under the folder "Time Deposits";
then click "Download") (data retrieved Nov. 4, 2011), with BANK OF KOREA, supra note 155
(click "4.1.1 Principal Financial Marketlndicators(daily) [sic]"; then click the check box next
to "Call Rate (Overnight-All Trades)"; then click "Download") (data retrieved Nov. 4, 2011).
158. YUN JEUNG-HYEON, CHAIRMAN, FIN. SUPERVISORY COMM'N, rEUNHAENG EoP
GAMDOK EOMMU SIHAENG SECHIKJ JUNG GAEJEONG SECHIK SEUNG-IN AN [PROPOSAL FOR
PARTIAL AMENDMENT OF THE DETAILED REGULATIONS ON SUPERVISION OF BANKING BusI-
NESS] 2 (2006), available at http://law.fss.or.kr/fss/lmx/main.jsp (follow "& f - "
hyperlink; then follow ".' d ] ' , hyperlink; then click " V' button labeled
"20060825").
159. See Press Release, Fin. Supervisory Servs., supra note 153, at 5.
160. YUN, supra note 158, at 2.
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cent to 100 percent, 16' thus easing somewhat the snowballing borrowing
under FSS 105. Later, in October 2008, the FSS further shortened the ob-
servation period for both assets and liabilities from three months to one
month162: after this change, banks were required to hold "assets with
residual tenor of one month or fewer" in an amount equal to 100 percent of
"liabilities with residual tenor of one month or fewer." This change further
dampened snowballing effects by lengthening the time required for rollo-
ver lending to appear again in the observation period.
The Korean case demonstrates the unintended consequences of an over-
ly prescriptive liquidity rule. The Local Currency Liquidity Ratio and FSS
105 were intended to bolster financial stability by increasing banks' stock of
liquid assets. Instead, the rules worked to undermine stability through ex-
cessive competition. There are clear lessons for policymakers responsible
for implementing the Basel Committee's recommendations: regulators
should inspect domestic markets and ensure that banks have viable strategic
options under the rule to avoid having banks follow a dominant compliance
strategy to distort the market.
CONCLUSION
The costs of the financial crisis of 2007-2008 have been enormous, and
the U.S. economy has yet to recover fully from the crisis's devastating con-
sequences. Financial regulators are charged with the difficult task of
balancing the useful effects of maturity transformation with its capacity to
expose both individual banks and the wider financial system to failure. The
Basel Committee's proposed Liquidity Coverage Ratio requirement will
likely work to curb those risky funding strategies that represented the cri-
sis's most egregious regulatory failures. However, the Liquidity Coverage
Ratio's highly disparate treatment of retail and wholesale funding may in-
stead undermine financial stability by increasing the competition for the
types of funding treated preferably under the rule. These concerns are not
merely theoretical: the Republic of Korea's experience with its postcrisis
liquidity regulation demonstrates that overly prescriptive rules can create
market distortions as banks compete to meet snowballing regulatory re-
quirements. When implementing the Liquidity Coverage Ratio in their
jurisdictions, financial regulators must take care that competition for tradi-
tionally more stable debt such as retail deposits does not erode the very
stability that supports maturity transformation and the modem financial sys-
tem.
161. The background rule required banks to hold "assets with residual tenor of three
months or fewer" in an amount equal to 100 percent of "liabilities with residual tenor of three
months or fewer." See supra text accompanying note 147.
162. See eunhaeng eop gamdok eommu sihaeng sechik [Detailed Regulations on
Supervision of Banking Business], Dec. 20, 2000, as amended, app. 3-4.
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